# NIXON'S RESIGNATION ...

# WATERGATE
# OR
# CHANGE OF POLICY ?

'H-THAWRA
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**Ath - Thawra**

**publications**

## WHY DID NIXON RESIGN ?

(Editorial published on 12.8.1974 by "ath-Thawra" — daily organ of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party that leads power in Iraq).

U.S. President Richard Nixon has at last resigned. And he was succeeded by Mr. Gerald Ford. His resignation might have come as a surprise to a good many people, but not to us. For many months, particularly since the October War and the first symptoms of the moves and attitudes assumed by America in the post-war period, we did anticipate that Nixon would somehow be ousted. We have actually expounded our opinions and conclusions, which were based on profound analysis of the American attitude and the stands of world Zionism, to both our Arab brothers and friends.

Ostensibly, America's ruling and influential

institutions, together with those trailing behind them in the world at large (including the Arab area), depict Nixon's resignation as an outcome of the Watergate scandal and its repercussions. This is meant to serve two ends : Drawing the curtain on the real motives that impelled Nixon to resign. Secondly, portraying America, for publicity purposes, as the "citadel of democracy and law" where no culprit, even if he were the President of America itself, can escape severe penalty.

We do not intend to wade into the details of the Watergate scandal. Nor do we intend to understate its impact on relations between ruling institutions in America. Suffice it to say here that anyone who follows the situation in America, or who reads the American press only, can all too easily realize how political and financial scandals as well as crimes are infesting this state, without breeding results and complications as did the Watergate scandal. To comprehend the reality of democracy and law in America and to appreciate the extent of the concern of the ruling institutions for these values, we need to

recall just one case : the assassination of late president John Kennedy.

Eleven years ago, that president of the United States of America was flagrantly assassinated, in broad day light. Still alive in our memories is the dramatic chain of murders triggered by the assassination : somebody kills the assassin only to be murdered under mysterious circumstances. Finally the case is shelved. But a few years afterwards, a brother of the assassinated president and candidate for the Presidency of the U.S. is also murdered. And some time later, a resounding moral scandal is sparked to defame a brother of the two murdered Kennedys, who was also considered a presidential candidate ! !

When the world's most efficient security organs in the world's most advanced country fail to unveil the facts and bring those responsible for the assassination of the president of that country to justice, one can easily form an insight of the concern the ruling institutions in that country harbour for upholding the rule of law. Reason and common sense can lead him to realize

the extent of the relationship between these institutions and the crime of assassination and the concomitant events and repercussions.

Is the America that assassinated Kennedy different from the America that drove Nixon to resign ? Or is what has happened in 1974 just a more sophisticated and less ferocious version of what had happened in 1963 ?

Despite its significance and the boisterous clamour it has flared within American and world mass media, Watergate is obviously not the bone of contention.

In a country like America, one should expect events, dispositions and attitudes that do not lend themselves to criteria common in other countries of the world. This is because America is the land where the world's most voracious and most savage capitalist institutions rue; where the relationship between the military and the capitalist establishments is not less close than what it had been under the Nazi Hitlerite establishment; where the intelligence services have unlimited powers, so much so that the former chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Edger

Hoover, maintained his post for decades and until his death without any President daring to replace him; and where Zionism enjoys a serious octopus-like system of relations and positions of power and influence.

By virtue of its extremely crucial role as leader of world imperialism and capitalism, by reason of its deep indulgence in the perpetration of crimes against innocent peoples — as had happened, and continues to happen, in Korea, Vietnam, Palestine, Cambodia and some Latin American countries — and due to the critical and dangerous developments and balancings in global conditions and in the conditions of areas sensitive to American interests and strategy... for all this, there occasionally emerge some "trials" of American policy represented in some persons in power. Through their coming to power and adoption of certain policies and attitudes, the ruling institutions, or some of them, drive at getting through a certain stage, surmounting a certain crisis or exploring new ways for assuring American interests and greedy designs. Once such persons have played the roles to which they

were cast, those institutions, or some of them, willfully get rid of them one way or the other.

Anyone acquainted with the development of American policy after the Second World War, i.e., since America assumed the leadership of world imperialism and capitalism, will remember that out of the five presidents who ruled in the post-war period (Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon) only two (Kennedy and Nixon) had pursued "non-traditional" policies, that is, they ventured new trials. In the end, Kennedy was assassinated and Nixon was forced to resign.

However, this should not imply that Kennedy and Nixon were maveries or in any way different in either nature or orientation from America's ruling institutions. On the contrary, they were all through part and parcel of the core of those institutions and among their most loyal servants. As a matter of fact, each of them enjoyed the wide support of the ruling institutions in the first phase of his presidency. Ironically coming to power under circumstances compelling the ruling institutions to undertake some trials in their

policies, they eventually fell victims to those trials.

As we have anticipated at a fairly early time, Nixon's resignation was the expected sequence of two basic trials of American policy : the first pertaining to relations with the Soviet Union, or what came to be known as international detente, and the second relating to the Arab area.

On November 28, 1973, an important meeting took place in Baghdad with a high-ranking official in a friendly state. This was said to him then :

> "The pressure exerted on Nixon by the Soviet Union, in the light of international considerations known to both parties, has managed to halt the war at its existing indicators. But we believe that nothing can prevent world Zionism, particularly U.S. Zionism, to reconsider its attitude towards Nixon any time it judges him as no longer useful to it. More precisely, should U.S. Zionism be convinced that the considerations ensuing from the Nixon-Brezhnev parlays impell America to apply a certain pressure on Israel, with

the aim of preventing Israel from territorial expansion and imposing on her secure boundaries, Zionism is indeed in a position to deal with Nixon in a way that turns him into a "stage" in the mainstream of American policy. Sure enough, Zionism, by virtue of its power and influence, is capable of removing Nixon at will. And by so doing, Zionism will have offered the American policy an opportunity to absolve itself from the commitments undertaken by Nixon before Brezhnev.

"U.S. Zionism is deeply entrenched in America. It also has durable relations with the Zionist entity and with world Zionism. As a result of the meeting that took place between Nixon and Brezhnev, the U.S. found itself committed, for moral considerations and on account of the weight of the talks and agreements conducted, to bring pressure to bear on Israel to the extent you have referred to. But when Nixon becomes an ordinary American citizen, can that commitment maintain its binding force ?"

The two trials of American policy — detente

and the attitude towards the Middle East issue — were dictated by certain circumstances and considerations; but they have never become a steady and comprehensive "American policy".

The trial represented in the raproachment with the Soviet Union, or what is termed as "international detente", has its own apparent roots and motives, chief of which is that both powers are convinced of the impossibility of their coming to direct war. As pointed out in the report endorsed by the Regional Leadership of the Party in mid-November, 1972, and as elucidated in "ath-Thawra's" series entitled "The Region... Why and Whither ?" published early in 1973, each of the two super-powers, not withstanding their mutual conviction that direct war between them is an impossibility, has made allowance for the question of "fighting through others", that is, wars or struggle waged by parties supported by this or the other super-power for occupying more advanced positions. The Indian-Pakistani war late in 1971 and the preceeding Middle East war of June 1967, together with the military coup in

Chile and the recent fighting in Cyprus, all bore witness to this.

This means that detente does not altogether rule out fighting and struggle. All that matters now is the different interpretations of the ruling American institutions regarding the extent, size, handling, timing, etc., of the struggle.

The ruling American institutions put up a strong opposition to the scope, size methods, handling and the timing of the international detente represented by the Nixon Administration. This is because the American industrial-military complex, though also convinced of the impossibility of direct war between the two super-powers, can not be happy with a universal and complete policy of detente that greatly diminishes its opportunities for inflaming the limited wars and conflicts that reinforce its positions inside America and enhance its profiteering from the arms race and from the production of weapons used in limited wars and conflicts.

While tolerating Nixon's trial that was motivated, in addition to reasons earlier mentioned, by growing European independence from

America and by American successive defeats in Vietnam, this complex was undoubtedly lurking for a favourable opportunity to re-adjust the policy of detente in a way that does not diminish either its influence or profits.

Along with the American industrial-military complex, the Zionist establishment discovered in the policy of dentente, particularly after the October War, another danger, adding to its previous reservations on this policy. International detente naturally arouses alarm and misgivings within the Zionist establishment in view of the effects it might have on the final outcome of the Arab-Zionist conflict and on Israel's expansionist covets.

As mentioned to the high-ranking visitor referred to above, the policy of detente imposed on America certain commitments obliging it to endeavour somehow to relatively curb Israel's expansionist designs in the Arab area.

Over the past few years, the Zionist forces in America kept creating obstacles to impede the policy of detente, as witnessed by their endeavours to make the U.S.-Soviet economic agree-

ments conditional to the Soviet Union's willingness to permit the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel.

Despite their reservations on the policy of detente and on the new expressions of American policy regarding the Middle East issue, Zionism and its entity have not, up to the October war, exhausted their need for Nixon and his policy.

Prior to the October war, the Zionist brandishing of the Watergate scandal represented an extra instrument for black-mailing and pressing Nixon's administration to render more military and financial aid to the Zionist entity. In keeping with America's strategic interests and traditional policy and as a result of special Zionist inducement, the Zionist entity did receive — during and after the October War — enormous American military and financial aid.

Following the cease-fire, when Israel was smarting under the shock of the war, Nixon's policy towards the Arab area was, in some respects, beneficial to Zionism, in that it enabled Israel to gain the needed time to rearrange its internal affairs and to strengthen its military

forces. Further, by reason of the idiotic manner in which some ruling Arab quarters handled the matter, Nixon's policy actually led to the lowering of Arab vigilance and mobilization, to sharpening many of the contradictions in the Arab area, to the deterioration of relations between certain Arab countries and the Soviet Union and to the consolidation of Arab reaction allied with America.

Known for planning far ahead, Zionism never dropped all its reservations against Nixon and his policy, notwithstanding the fact that Zionism had profited by that policy in gaining time. It only added the Watergate scandal to its other reserve arms and methods destined for encountering Nixon at the right time.

Having achieved the disengagement of forces on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts in addition to nearly maturing the disengagement of forces on the Jordanian front, and facing none of the hard circumstaces prevailing in the wake of the October War, Zionism finds it useful to overthrow Nixon, so that he and his commitments can

vanish before the convocation of the Geneva Conference, where the question of withdrawal and the future conditions of the Western Bank is to come up for direct negotiations.

Israel sees that Nixon's absence serves its interests better in Geneva, more so when America is under a new president who has made no promises either to the Arabs or to the Soviet Union and who is also a dependable friend keen to present both allegiance and aid.

Now the American industrial-military complex finds itself in a better situation : The Vietnamese war has become less explosive and less expensive. Europe lost a good deal of its independent positions vis-a-vis American policy and became increasingly compelled to trail behind American policy, as evidenced by the political changes in the most important European countries, namely Britain, France and West Germany. Among the main factors leading to the change in Europe are the attitudes assumed by Arab reaction, headed by Saudi Arabia, and the American-guided deviationist policies followed in

handling the question of oil during and after the October War.

Now that the extent, size, methods and the way of management of the detente represented by Nixon is no longer a need and a trial for exploring better opportunities and for gaining time to surmount difficult crises and situations, the ruling American industrial-military complex sees no use in maintaining it. Therefore, it is in their interest that Nixon should go.

When the will of the American industrial-military complex and that of the Zionist establishment — two closely inter-related and inter-linked organizations — agree on something, they can be relied upon to get that thing done. Their interests and will demanded the removal of Nixon and getting rid of his commitments that were imposed upon them by certain circumstances. So be it, and Nixon departed.

Now, does Nixon's removal mean any change in the American policy ? At the outset, we need to keep this fact in mind : regardless of who occupies the White House, or who assumes the

portfolio of foreign affairs, America remains an aggressive imperialist colonialist state — No. 1 enemy of the Arabs and No. 1 enemy of all peoples aspiring to liberation and progress. This is a fact on which we must never make any mistake. From this angle there shall be no change in the American policy.

But as far as the matter is related to the policy of international detente and Nixon's attitude towards the Middle East issue, which, in essence, do not basically contradict either the nature of American policy or American interests and strategies, there shall certainly be a change Otherwise, why has Nixon been forced to resign?

But changes in the policies of major powers do not, always, take place through swift, direct and dramatic ways. They take long to materialize, across a long and complex chain of attitudes — big and small, basic and branch — and they stretch over a specific period of time.

To avoid reactions on the part of the Soviet Union, the Arabs and the human society, it is in the interest of America to emphasize, for the

time being, that there shall be no change in its foreign policy and that the whole matter is a purely domestic affair. And this is exactly what the new President Ford has been anxious to affirm and what can be understood from retaining Kissinger as Foreign Minister. But this deliberate emphasis reveals the truth as much as the new American officials are trying to hide it.

A stage and a trial in the American policy is now over; and a new stage and a new trial has begun.

In this context, we need to touch upon the bet made on Nixon by certain ruling Arab circles. It is common knowledge that several official Arab circles have been, for a long time now and particularly after the October War, betting on the person of ex-president Nixon and on the person of his foreign minister Henry Kissinger. These circles justify their bet by claiming that Nixon and Kissinger represented a "change" in the American policy towards the Arab-Zionist conflict and that they are also making serious efforts to reach peaceful solutions to the conflict.

The betting of these Arab circles on the two American leaders (Nixon and Kissinger) reached an extent impelling them to speak and behave as a party aligned with Nixon in the internal American squabbles sparked by the Watergate scandal. It has also made them respond to a great many personal requests from Nixon in addition to official American requests. Examples of this are the abnormal welcome given to Nixon in Cairo and Saudi Arabia's immediate execution of Nixon's request for increasing oil production and decreasing oil prices.

Right from the beginning, we had a clear opinion on this subject. The jist of our opinion is this : The stand of American imperialism towards the Arabs has not undergone any essential change. But this does not deny that it has, after the October War, assumed new forms and expressions as a result of the new circumstances and developments. We had also maintained that the so-called new changes in the American attitude represented in Nixon and Kissinger did not actually constitute a sufficient turning obviating the sharp contradiction between the Arab nation

and imperialism. As it has always been, America remained, before and after the October War, the same old No. 1 and fundamental ally of Zionism, supporting and consolidating its aggression against the Arabs and its usurpation of Arab rights and lands. And despite the lapse of nine months between the cease-fire and Nixon's resignation, the promises circulated by Nixon and Kissinger regarding Zionist withdrawal and the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council failed to live up to their expected seriousness and effectiveness.

For all these reasons, we never seriously viewed the bet that certain official Arab circles made on the person of Nixon and the person of Kissinger. We held that the bet, even if it stemmed out of good will, is immaterial as far as the restitution of Arab rights is concerned. We kept emphasizing that the right attitude is to embark upon a meaningful action polarizing all Arab capabilities within the framework of a serious national long-term programme of struggle aimed at undermining imperialist interests and at fight-

ing against imperialism and Zionism in every conceivable way.

In our opinion, this is the only path that actually leads to force America, all America and irrespective of who is at the helm of power in America, to reformulate its attitude towards the Arab nation in a manner that enables us to restore what is restorable of Arab rights at this juncture — without compromising or ceding any historic right unattainable now.

Perhaps we are offending no one when we say that those betting on Nixon and Kissinger used to depict their stand as the "height of political skill" while stigmatizing their critics with political ignorance. But events came to prove once again that their stand was "void of any political skill". The horse on which they bet stumbled even sooner than those who placed no hope on it have anticipated .

The experience of the relationship between those official Arab circles and Nixon has also proved that it was only the latter who has benefitted from the bet for consolidating his position

at home and that the former gained nothing worth mentioning and lost all their stakes.

For several decades now, the question of "political skill" used to be posed in the official Arab circles as an alternative for the nationalist national and revolutionary solutions and attitudes, which invariably used to be branded with political ignorance, extremism and so forth. But the records of contemporary Arab history prove that all the protagonists of "political skill" have, sooner or later, ended up on the brink of political bankrupcy. Evidence is the outcome of the latest trial.

Under the circumstances of the current development of our homeland and in the face of the major challenges and tasks confornting our Arab nation and its forces of liberation, the only "skillful" attitude is a steadfast stand based, primarily, on the Arab political, military, economic and human energies and competent of efficiently hurling all these energies into a serious long-term battle against American imperialism and its interests in our Arab area as well as against Zionism.

This is the attitude that leads to the attain-

ment of our aim and that deserves to be described as the "height of wisdom and skill". Other political attitudes, such as the bet on Nixon and Kissinger, which are drummed up by imperialist-associated reaction and corrupt officials within the ruling regimes in certain Arab countries, have not only ended up in deviating from the sound patriotic and national line. They have also proved to be cheap. Luckily, like lies, they were this time short-lived — indeed very short-lived.

## THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE ARAB AREA.

## LAST YEAR'S POLICIES END IN FAILURE

(Editorial published on 18.9.1974 dy "ath-Thawra" — daily organ of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party that leads power in Iraq).

A flow of extensive reports shows that the Zionist enemy is making large-scale military preparations. These reports are connected with Zionist Premier Yitzhak Rabin's recent visit to Washington and his talks there with the new U.S. President Gerald Ford and with the tremendous military aid the U.S. decided to make available to the enemy by an emergency marine- and air-lift, as it did before and during the October War of 1973.

Simultaneously, successive enemy statements convey its conditions for a new partial and unspe-

cified withdrawal from Sinai. In their total sum, these enemy terms mean the complete liquidation of the conflict with Egypt — without the latter recovering all its occupied territories and, worse still, without the least association between the question of withdrawal from the occupied Egyptian land and the Arab cause as a whole. These statements are accompanied by reports and other relative enemy declarations affirming the enemy's adamant insistence on retaining the Syrian Golan Heights and on rejecting any notion of the so-called "Palestinian state".

In such an atmosphere, diplomatic efforts are being paid to raise the Palestinian issue before the U.N. General Assemby. Meanwhile, other diplomatic arrangements continue to be made by the Arab regimes, which have a stake in the current policy trends in the Arab area, with the United States, the Soviet Union and other quarters.

Now, how are we to evaluate the present situation ?

In regard to Zionist military preparations,

newspapers, news agencies and political commentators agree on a preliminary conclusion contending that the Zionist enemy is bracing itself up for a new retaliatory aggression on the Arab countries, obviously to make up for the material and moral losses it has suffered during the October War of 1973.

This inference is generally valid. For the enemy can not but think in terms of aggression and prepare itself accordingly. Whenever an opportunity offers itself, the enemy will undoubtedly perpetrate aggression on the Arab nation, whatever the pretexts and justifications available. This is because the ideology of the enemy and its racist and expansionist policy are naturally based on aggression, on territorial aggrandizement and on working to undermine the Arab nation politically, militarily and economically.

But the preliminary conclusion saying that the enemy is preparing for a new military aggression on the Arabs does not cover the whole question. It focusses part of the new image of the entire situation.

The Zionist stance, whether relating to military preparations or to "hard-lining" statements, is, as we had anticipated beforehand, the natural sequel of the stands and policies pursued by certain Arab regimes ever since the cease-fire. And as we had also anticipated, the Zionist stance is one of the direct consequences of Nixon's resignation and the change the American policy is undergoing.

In the "Report on the October War", issued by the 8th Regional Conference of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party in January last, we forecast that the enemy would display a certain measure of "flexibility" concerning withdrawal from Sinai — with the aim of alienating Egypt from both the Arab nation and the Arab cause. We also forecast that the enemy would not show the same measure of flexibility regarding withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. And never were we under any illusion regarding the so-called "Palestinian state".

Upon the resignation of Nixon, we wrote that the American industrial-military complex

and the Zionist establishment in the U.S. have both determined to oust Nixon because they have exhausted all their need for him and consequently, wanted to shed off the commitments which Nixon's policy entailed, whether in regard to international detente or to the Arab issue.

Meanwhile, we emphasized that the change in the American policy after the ouster of Nixon would not be swift or direct or dramatic. We explained that the expected change would have to take its normal course, through a long and complicated series of stands — big and small, basic and branch — and over a specific period of time.

Logically, the change expected in the era of Gerald Ford and Nelson Rockefeller will reflect itself in more direct and speedier ways on the Arab issue than it will do on the question of international detente, particularly as concerns relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the latter sphere, the room for manoeuvring is narrow and the electrified spots are apt to emerge instantaneously. By contrast, the arena for manoeuvring in the Arab area is

wide. Besides, the state of fluidity brought about by the policies pursued by certain Arab regimes in the course of last year has created favourable conditions for the realization of policy changes relating to the Arab issue speedier than in regard to the policy of international detente.

The new Ford Administration has judged that the best way to disown the commitments undertaken by Nixon in respect to the Arab issue — commitments about which we never had any illusions and which we have all through dismissed as unserious and unworthy of the concessions made for them — is to impell the Zionist enemy to take up a "hard-lining" stand and to back up this toughness with a huge military-economic base.

By so doing, while the Ford Administration will be in a position to claim that it has not "changed" and that it is true to the American promise to "endeavour" for a peaceful solution to the Arab area crisis, it shall also be able to place the concerned Arab rulers face to face with the reality of the Zionist "hard-lining" stand and

to whisper into their ears—directly or indirectly — that the new situation demands that they either make more concessions or go to war once again.

The American-Zionist plan is based on the assumption that the Arab regimes which went to war in October 1973 are now incapable of resuming the fighting for several military, political and psychological reasons. These include : The regimes in question have become far too entangled in the policies and trials that created the present situation. They have also forfeited many trump cards: military economic and political. Further, they weakened their own domestic fronts and the entire Arab front and have dangerously undermined their international relations whether with the socialist camp or with Western Europe.

Thus, the Arab regimes that pursued their well known policies throughout the past year are now left with nothing in their hands except the "forces disengagement" agreement and a burden of the moral and material concessions

made by them and by certain leaderships of the Palestinian resistance movement during their march after the mirage.

The other results which those regimes and certain leaderships of the Palestinian resistance movement dreamed as a reward for their policies of last year are no longer surely attainable.

Under these very circumstances, efforts are being exerted to raise the Palestinian issue before the U.N. General Assembly. Before dealing with the motives and consequences of this step, we should like to elucidate this point : In principle, we have no objection to raising the Palestinian issue before the U.N. General Assembly. This is the issue of our people's struggle for liberation and for the restoration of their usurped land. Such being the case, it is only natural that we should spare no efforts to raise it from all platforms of the world, and the U.N. is among the most important of these forums. But there is an essential difference between presenting the issue with the aim of justifying the relinquishing of all our rights — on a false hope of

gaining "part" of them — and presenting it with the aim of winning over world public opinion and the international organization to the side of the Arab just cause.

Now, what does the presentation of the issue to the U.N. mean to the parties which, to one degree or another, are contributing to the present policies ?

It is quite apparent that bilateral contacts and efforts — whether between the Soviet Union and America or between the involved Arab regimes and America — have faild to secure even the recognition of the Palestinian rights within the framework of the conception advocated by some international and Arab quarters and by certain circles of the resistance movement — a conception that is incomplete, that fragments the issue and that eventually leads to its liquidation.

When neither unilateral nor bilateral contacts and efforts succeeded in attaining what has been hoped and desired during the last year, kicking the ball into the large field seems to be a comfortable choice for all the parties, notwithstanding

their different and contradicting motives and policies. In the U.N. responsibility becomes universal and in the event of failure, the effects will be less pronounced. But in the event of success, every one will be able to claim a share.

In our judgement, even America will not necessarily object to the presentation of the issue before the U.N. This is because the long time which debates on such issues usually take will render easier the task of fluidifying the situation, shedding off commitments already undertaken and of consolidating the accomplished fact. Besides, the record of the U.N. does not prove its ability to have its resolutions enforced. The fact that Security Council Resolution No. 242 remains unimplemented seven years from its adoption is a reminder that any amended from of this resolution is not likely to fair any better.

The drums of war now being beaten in Tel Aviv are definitely the forerunner of the new American policy — the policy of Ford and Rockefeller succeeding Nixon's. Other political moves in the Arab area are a clear reflection of the failure of last year's policies and the policies

preceding them and are a reversal to the policy of blind alley that characterized the situation before the October War.

Unless radical changes take place in the policies of the concerned Arab regimes and unless these regimes bind themselves, seriously and practically, with the rationale of the war of liberation with all the political, economic, military and unitary attitudes entailed, the Arab area will revert to the conditions that prevailed between June 1967 and October 1973. And the only surviving legacy of the October War will be the disengagement of forces agreement and the many concessions.

Deposited at the National
Library under No. 859/1974

First Edition 1974
10,000 Copies

This booklet contains two editorials published by " Ath-Thawra ", organ of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. The editorials deal with the role of the American industrial-military complex and the Zionist establishment in Nixon's ouster. They also refer to the changes taking place in the policy of the U.S.A. and elucidate the reasons that led to the failure of the policies of the Arab regimes that bet on the person of Nixon.

"Ath-Thawra"

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